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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

announced that the instructions which had been issued to the Home
Army two months ago regarding eventual co-operation with the Soviet
forces, were being enlarged upon and that the forces of the Home Army
in the territories occupied by the Russians would also propose co-operation.
Dziennik Polski (The Polish Daily) in London,, in its leading article,
explained the Government's concessions along the following lines:
" (1). Only among dictatorships can the government freely decide on
the question of important state problems. The supposition that the
government may dispose of state territory forms a part of Fascist ideology.
Exclusively and only in democratic countries can the people legally decide
on the forms of their state organisation.
" (2). Such a decision (the renouncement of part of its territory) can be
taken by a nation, only under the conditions of complete liberty. Any
election under conditions of occupation without guarantee of secrecy and
freedom could not be recognised as the expression of the free will of a nation
and therefore it has no legal value.
" (3). The problem of the frontier is one of the factors in the life of the
State. The realisation of the results of any discussion concerning this
problem would follow after the war and would embrace every frontier of
Poland. It is necessary to stress this point as, lately, in the British Press,
voices have been raised defending the integrity of Germany.
" (4). The problem of Poland's frontier is international and cannot be
settled in a bilateral discussion c between ourselves ' and should be settled
only by international agremeent.
" The eventual reconstruction of the Polish Cabinet cannot be the result
of the demands of a foreign State. Poland in particular still recalling the
painful memory of the activities of the Russian Ambassadors, Repnin and
Stackelberg of the eighteenth century, cannot agree to such demands."
^Moscow's disagreement with Poland was not merely a question of
frontiers alone. Above all else loomed the uncertainty of Polish freedom
and independence after the war. The general opinion of the Poles was
that, when the Red Army entered Poland, it would be able to act as it
desired, and it was difficult to foresee any other Allied Power who would
be in a position to hamper its activities. But, at any rate, those activities
would not be carried out with the consent of the Polish people.
The decision of the Polish Government to grant a concession in the
form of a proposed " demarcation line " behind Lwow and Wilno, did
not receive the backing of Polish opinion, and the Government felt the
need of issuing a special order to the Polish troops in the Middle East
who were about to enter the war on the Italian front. Anxiety was felt
that this decision of the Government might have some unexpected re-
percussions, particularly among those Polish soldiers who had already
passed through Russian prisons and labour camps. Polish opposition
had stressed the fact that the Government was over-stepping its preroga-
tives, and its Premier, Mikolajczyk, became the target for a great deal
of adverse criticism.
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